Wednesday, November 19, 2014
Practical Difficulties of Eliminating Externalities
As Alison Butler does not fail to address in her article, eliminating externalities can be extremely complicated. Assigning property rights seems logical in simple examples, as we hope that principles of the market will create an equilibrium between private and social costs. In practice (using the chemical plant upstream from a town example), however, it seems like it would be very difficult to A. quantify environmental damage with a dollar amount (how much should the firm pay the town), and B. gauge the opinion of a community regarding the optimal level of pollution (what level of pollution should the town pay the firm to reach). As Butler notes, this all becomes increasingly confusing as these problems become international, as the natures of different nations inherently predispose them to accepting different environmental practices and policies, making the formation of international agreements on these issues much more difficult to obtain.
Monday, November 17, 2014
News: IPE and the Environment
A couple of relevant topics in the news recently as we will be discussing the environment this week:
Last week, the U.S. and China released a "joint announcement" on climate change, with both sides setting long term targets to lower emissions and utilize alternative fuels.
Climate change was also a subject of interest at this weekend's G20 summit in Australia, where additional countries joined in on committing to combating climate change.
Hopefully these types of proclamations from the world's leading economies will encourage more actors in the public and private sectors to follow suit.
Last week, the U.S. and China released a "joint announcement" on climate change, with both sides setting long term targets to lower emissions and utilize alternative fuels.
Climate change was also a subject of interest at this weekend's G20 summit in Australia, where additional countries joined in on committing to combating climate change.
Hopefully these types of proclamations from the world's leading economies will encourage more actors in the public and private sectors to follow suit.
Wednesday, November 5, 2014
Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness
Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health,
Wealth, and Happiness, by
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, is about how people make decisions. Thaler and Sunstein realize that, despite the
depiction of homo economicus in
economics textbooks, where humans are assumed to always act rationally and make
decisions unfailingly well, the idea of the economic man carries little
weight, and that human beings often make poor choices. Poor decision-making can be the result of a
several variables, such as bias, “inertia” (otherwise known as laziness), or,
most importantly, the circumstances under which decisions are made. The authors emphasize that the way that
choices are presented can have a major impact on the decisions people
make. Inevitably, this means that those
in charge of designing the choice structure, known in the book as “choice architects,” can
have significant influence over people’s decisions. One particularly illustrative example of a
choice architect is that of someone who designs the way food is arranged in a
cafeteria. If the designer knows that
different food arrangements will lead people to consume different foods, then
the designer has the ability to alter consumption choices based on cafeteria
design. Thaler and Sunstein propose that
if all choices will be influenced by choice architects then better choice
architecture can be used to help people make better decisions. They explain that by adhering to the idea of
“libertarian paternalism,” a type of intervention that maintains individual liberties, choice architects can subtly “nudge” people to make
certain choices while maintaining the liberty and individuality of the chooser.
When are nudges appropriate? Despite criticizing humans' ability to make
decisions, Thaler and Sunstein do not believe that humans need help making
every decision that they face. According
to the authors, nudges should be reserved for difficult decisions that are
infrequent, situations in which people may not have adequate experience or
information to make the best choices. An example of this would be selecting a mortgage, a situation in which people often lack a detailed understanding of the results of their choices. The authors also endorse nudges when choices and their consequences are
separated in time (choosing a time to wake up vs. actually getting out of bed) or when choosers are forced to make choices to which they get
little feedback or guidance (understanding fees associated with a cell phone bill). Under any
of these unique sets of circumstances, people could likely use assistance from choice
architects.
In order to preserve the libertarianism proposed by
libertarian paternalism, nudges made by choice architects must not force
choosers to relinquish their right to choose.
Choosers should also face low opt-out costs, which will allow them to
choose autonomously with little difficulty.
Instead, changes in choice architecture are simply meant to make it
easier for people to make good choices.
By understanding human tendencies and behavior, choice architects can
influence peoples' behavior without having to directly impose outcomes on
individuals. Thaler and Sunstein explain
a variety of tools that could be used as nudges, such as improving default
options, providing choosers more information and feedback, and reducing
barriers to action. While all of these
nudges can have extremely beneficial impacts on peoples' lives, choosers are
never forced or compelled to make certain decisions. Choosers, however, maintain the right to
ignore these nudges and continue to choose poorly, thus preserving
libertarianism.
All of this talk about libertarian paternalism sounds simple, as public or private institutions only need to use their insider
information and wisdom to help people make good decisions.
But what constitutes a “good” decision?
Thaler and Sunstein ask this question in their introduction to show that
there are a variety of ways to interpret this question. Think about another example from the book: In
2000, Sweden privatized its Social Security system. The government allowed
individuals to create their own retirement portfolios, but also provided a
default option for people who were either too busy, too lazy, or too absent
minded to select their own. How does a
government go about creating a “good” retirement portfolio for the default
option, in order to create a choice architecture model that will be beneficial
for people that do not create their own?
Should the idea of a “good” portfolio be the one that will provide the
best returns? Or would “good” be a
portfolio that most closely resembles the portfolio people would have chosen
independently? Or should there be no
default portfolio at all, forcing people to make choices or not have any sort
of retirement plan? You can see that
this all becomes very complicated, and that while choice architecture can be
very influential, coming up with the definition of a “good” choice can be
controversial.
Another issue, raised by Thaler and Sunstein in the
closing chapter of their book, is the slippery slope posed by these
interventionist (yet libertarian) policies.
If choice architects have the capacity to make people’s lives better,
why don’t the choice architects turn nudges in to mandates, or “shoves?” In other words, why even leave people with
the ability to make bad choices? The
concept of libertarian paternalism opens the door for “hard” paternalists to
stretch these theories to their limits.
While the authors believe that people of all parts of the political
spectrum should be able to see the wisdom of libertarian paternalism, strong
anti-interventionists and other’s wary of loss of liberty may resent these
policies (see the link in my last blog post). A related problem is that there is not necessarily anyone overseeing choice architects, which could pose a problem if the choice architect was inherently "bad." If choice architects lose sight of the libertarian aspect of nudges, an
escalation in the scale of paternalism could lead to a slippery slope.
The ideas of libertarian paternalism and social economics
are relatively new phenomena. While the
government and other institutions have started to embrace some of these
policies (Sunstein has served as an advisor to President Obama), it
is quite likely that we will see additional research in these fields have a
continued impact on our lives. A detailed understanding of social economics can help us better understand why people make poor choices (like how financial crises happen) and how interventions can help correct these problems.
Tuesday, November 4, 2014
Early Thoughts on Nudge
http://mediamatters.org/video/2010/09/22/beck-cass-sunstein-is-the-most-dangerous-man-in/171019
I've posted a link to a video from 2010 in which Glenn Beck presents his (extremely unbiased) opinion on Cass Sunstein, the author of my book, Nudge. In the video, Beck calls Sunstein "the most dangerous man in America." As talk show hosts seem to "conveniently" gloss over many of the details, here are a few to remember in order to understand how Sunstein would respond:
1. Nudges, according to the principle of Libertarian Paternalism, are suppose to create choice architecture that provides low-cost opt-out rights in order to ensure that people maintain their freedom to choose. In other words, the right to choose not to be influenced by Nudges must always be maintained.
2. Nudges are best for influencing decisions that are difficult and rare, where people may be lacking the adequate experience or information to make the best choices. While Sunstein does acknowledge the Homer Simpson qualities of humans, he believes that people are very capable of making easy decisions that they have experience making, such as choosing which groceries to buy, while they may struggle with difficult decisions, such as selecting retirement plans or mortgages.
More to come on Wednesday.
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